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Why Have the Dynamics of 
Labor Productivity Changed?
By Willem Van Zandweghe
T
he strength of the nascent economic recovery  —and of the la-
bor market—will depend importantly on labor productivity. 
By itself, faster productivity growth contributes to faster out-
put growth. At the same time, stronger productivity gains allow firms 
to increase output without adding workers. Some analysts believe that 
faster productivity growth contributed to the “jobless recoveries” after 
the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions.
In recent years, the U.S. economy has undergone a change in the 
behavior of productivity over the business cycle. Until the mid-1980s, 
productivity growth rose and fell with output growth. But since then 
the relationship between these two variables has weakened, and they 
have even moved in different directions. For example, from the fourth 
quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009, output in the nonfarm 
business sector fell at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent, while labor 
productivity grew 1.7 percent on average. Understanding the causes of 
this changed relationship is essential to gauging the outlook for produc-
tivity, jobs, and output in the current recovery. 
Willem Van Zandweghe is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Max Olivier, a former research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article. This 
article is on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
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Fluctuations in productivity depend on two factors: the mix of shocks 
that drive the business cycle and the transmission of those shocks to out-
put and labor market activity. Thus, two hypotheses stand out as plausible 
explanations for the change in the cyclical behavior of productivity. 
First, a decline in the importance of supply shocks for the business 
cycle may have changed the relationship of productivity and output 
over the business cycle. Supply shocks are a driving force of output. For 
instance, an oil price increase raises the cost of production and leads 
firms to reduce the amount of output produced. Such shocks steer both 
output and productivity (output per hour) in the same direction. Con-
sequently, if the importance of supply shocks for the business cycle di-
minished, the relationship between these variables would be weakened.
Second, structural changes in the labor market may have altered the 
transmission of shocks to the labor market and production. Specifically, a 
different labor market environment may have prompted firms to modify 
the way they meet their labor needs in response to shocks to the economy. 
For instance, diminished labor adjustment costs, such as hiring and firing 
costs, or increased uncertainty about future demand at the firm level may 
stimulate firms to adjust labor inputs more aggressively.
This article examines the shift in the behavior of labor produc-
tivity over the business cycle and assesses the supply shock and struc-
tural change explanations for the shift. The analysis finds that the im-
portance of supply shocks in the business cycle has been stable over 
time. However, the behavior of productivity over the business cycle has 
shifted in response to both supply and demand shocks. Together, these 
results imply the shift in the business cycle behavior of productivity is 
most likely the result of structural changes in the labor market.1
The first section documents the shift in the cyclical behavior of 
productivity that occurred in the mid-1980s. The second section exam-
ines whether this shift can be explained by a diminished role of supply 
shocks in the business cycle. The third section evaluates whether the 
shift can be explained by structural changes in the labor market. The 
fourth section discusses the implications of the shift in cyclical produc-
tivity for the current recovery.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  7
I.  THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF PRODUCTIVITY
To understand the relationship of productivity to output, this sec-
tion introduces an accounting identity that relates output, productivity, 
and labor inputs. The section then documents changes in relationships 
among these variables—specifically, between productivity and output 
and between productivity and labor inputs in the nonfarm business 
sector. These changes occurred in the mid-1980s. 
Productivity is measured as output per hour. Hence, in a recession 
productivity falls if total hours worked decline more slowly than out-
put. Conversely, productivity rises if hours decline faster than output. 
Casual observation shows that productivity has behaved differently 
in recent recessions than in recessions until the 1980s. Chart 1 com-
pares the evolution of productivity and output in the 1981-82 and the 
2007-09 recessions.2  In the most recent recession, productivity surged 
as firms scaled back hours more rapidly than output. In contrast, in 
the 1981-82 recession, which was also severe, productivity weakened 
slightly as hours declined somewhat more slowly than output.
Output decomposition
Firms can increase output either by producing more output per 
hour worked—that is, by increasing productivity—or by increasing the 
total hours worked. Total hours worked can be adjusted by varying 
the level of employment and by varying the hours per worker.3 Thus, 
output can be decomposed into productivity and labor inputs in the 
following accounting identity:
Y=P+N+H.
On the left side of this relationship, Y denotes the logarithm of out-
put per capita. On the right side, P measures the logarithm of output 
per hour worked, N denotes the logarithm of the number of persons 
employed per capita, and H stands for the logarithm of the average 
hours per worker. Output and employment are converted to per-capita 
terms by dividing them by the civilian noninstitutional population of 
age 16 years and older. These variables are referred to below as output, 
productivity, employment, and hours per worker. 8  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The changing cyclical behavior of productivity
Output, productivity, and labor inputs fluctuate over time due to 
both the business cycle and long-term trends. Long-term trends reflect 
forces such as gradual increases in population, technology, and the capi-
tal stock. Consequently, assessing business cycle fluctuations requires 
removing the influence of long-term trends from the actual data. 
Economists commonly use two methods to remove, or filter out, 
long-term trends, both of which are incorporated in this analysis. One 
method is to use growth rates of output, employment, hours per worker, 
and productivity as measures of business cycle components. The second 
is to use statistical filters that rely on long, weighted averages to capture 
and remove trend influences. These statistical filters, such as the widely 
used Hodrick and Prescott filter, allow for the possibility of gradual 
movements in trend growth rates over time.4
The cyclical components of output and productivity moved to-
gether over the business cycle until the 1981-82 recession (Chart 2). 
For example, during recoveries, both output and productivity rose. But 
during the expansion following the 1981-82 recession, cyclical produc-
tivity and output began to move in opposite directions.
This change in the business cycle behavior of productivity is more 
formally quantified by correlation coefficients for the periods be-
fore and since 1984.5 Table 1 shows the correlations for productivity,   
Chart 1
OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE 1981-82 AND 
2007-09 RECESSIONS
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Chart 2
CYCLICAL OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
Table 1
CORRELATIONS
Note: Series’ trends are removed with the Hodrick and Prescott filter.










Productivity-Output 0.75 0.47 -0.28*** 0.64 -0.03 -0.75***
Productivity-Employment 0.13 -0.33 -0.46*** 0.10 -0.60 -0.70***
Productivity-Hours 0.24 -0.24 -0.48*** 0.51 -0.20 -0.71***
Output-Employment 0.71 0.61 -0.10* 0.81 0.79 -0.02
Output-Hours 0.61 0.46 -0.15** 0.76 0.78 0.02
Employment-Hours 0.42 0.38 -0.04 0.47 0.59 0.12*
Note: Variables are expressed in logarithms and growth rates are approximated by first differences. Test 
of equality of correlations across the two subsamples is based on Fisher’s z-transformation. Significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by *,**, and ***, respectively.
output, and labor inputs. To isolate business cycle components, the 
variables are either growth rates (the first two columns) or are expressed 
as deviations from the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) trend (the last 
two columns). The correlation between output and productivity falls 
sharply between samples and even changes sign when the business cycle   
components are measured with the HP filter. In that case, the correla-
tion from 1948 to 1983 was 0.64. From 1984 to the second quarter of 
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correlation reflects a decline in the correlations between productivity 
and labor inputs. These changed sign with both measures of business 
cycle fluctuations. For instance, when the HP filter is used, the produc-
tivity-employment and productivity-hours per worker correlations fell 
from 0.10 and 0.51, respectively, before 1984 to -0.60 and -0.20 since 
then. The correlations between output and labor inputs have remained 
highly positive across both periods. 
A variance decomposition of output provides another way to see 
the changed cyclical behavior of productivity. Output is the sum of 
productivity and labor inputs. Thus, the variance of output is the sum 
of the variances of productivity, labor inputs, and their covariances. 
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition of output, again based on 
growth rates and business cycle components measured by the HP fil-
ter, for the periods before and since 1984.6 In each column, the sum 
of the first six rows is equal to the variance of output, given in the last 
row. The last row shows that the volatility of output has declined since 
1984; this decline is often called the Great Moderation. The rows above 
show that the decline in output volatility has been due in part to small-
er fluctuations in productivity, employment, and hours per worker. But 
it has also been due to the shift in the cyclical behavior of productivity, 
which went from a positive covariance with labor inputs before 1984 to 
a negative covariance since then. 
The variance decomposition thus shows that the changed cyclical 
behavior of productivity is associated with the following facts. Until 
the mid-1980s, changes in output were typically larger than changes 
in labor inputs, so productivity rose during expansions and fell dur-
ing contractions. In contrast, since the mid-1980s the fluctuations in 
output have declined relative to those in labor inputs, weakening the 
procyclical behavior of productivity.7
The subsequent analysis explores why the correlation of productiv-
ity with output has dropped in the last 25 years compared with the 
preceding postwar period. Understanding this change in correlation 
requires an assessment of why the correlation of productivity with la-
bor inputs has also fallen. The analysis considers two alternative ex-
planations. First, the importance of supply shocks as a driving force 
of business cycle fluctuations may have diminished. Second, structural ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  11
changes in the labor market may have altered the responses of output, 
labor inputs, and hence productivity to different shocks.
II.  THE ROLE OF SUPPLY SHOCKS
Has the importance of supply shocks as a driver of the business 
cycle diminished since the mid-1980s? This section examines this ex-
planation for the change in the business cycle behavior of productivity 
and finds that the relative importance of supply shocks to the business 
cycle has not declined. 
Theoretical channel between supply shocks and productivity fluctuations
Supply shocks are the main impulse of cyclical fluctuations in 
output and productivity according to the Real Business Cycle theory 
(Prescott). This theory has greatly influenced macroeconomics since 
the 1980s for its assertion that business cycle fluctuations are the desir-
able outcome of consumers’ and firms’ decisions in the face of shocks to 
the economy. However, the role it assigns to supply shocks has become 
less prominent in much of the subsequent macroeconomic literature 
that studies the sources of business fluctuations.
An economic model of the relationship between production factors 
and output shows how supply shocks affect the relationship between 
output and productivity. As represented in the following production 
Table 2
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT
Note: Variables are expressed in logarithms and growth rates are approximated by first differences. Var 
and Cov stand for variance and covariance, respectively. The numbers are multiplied by a factor 1002.
Growth rates HP filter
Before 1984 Since 1984 Before 1984 Since 1984
Var(Productivity) 0.99 0.43 1.56 0.80
Var(Employment) 0.72 0.37 3.21 1.93
Var(Hours) 0.13 0.09 0.30 0.23
2×Cov(Employment, Hours) 0.26 0.14 0.92 0.77
2×Cov(Productivity, Employment) 0.20 -0.27 0.34 -1.48
2×Cov(Productivity, Hours) 0.18 -0.09 0.69 -0.17
Sum = Var(Output) 2.48 0.67 7.01 2.0712  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
function, output increases with technology (A), employment (N), and 
hours per worker (H):8  
Y= a × (A+N+H).
Output increases if there are more workers or if each worker works 
longer hours, consistent with the positive correlation between output 
and the labor inputs documented in the previous section. 
In addition, output rises if the technology level increases, creating 
more output per hour worked. Changes in technology, as broadly de-
fined in common macroeconomic models of the business cycle, corre-
spond to supply shocks. These shocks to technology (supply), which are 
not directly measurable, consist of any changes that permanently affect 
the transformation of factor inputs into output. For instance, a tech-
nology breakthrough that allows firms to produce more with the same 
amount of worker hours would be captured as an increase in the model 
variable  A. In common macroeconomic models, technology shocks 
captured by the variable A also encompass other types of changes that 
affect the transformation of inputs into outputs, such as a drop in raw 
materials prices or a rise in the available capital per worker, possibly 
brought about by a cut in the tax rate on capital. 
Finally, the coefficient a determines the returns to scale in produc-
tion and is assumed positive but not greater than one. Accordingly, if a 
firm doubles the scale of production by doubling its total worker hours, 
production increases proportionally, but can at best be doubled.
The relationship of productivity with technology and the labor in-
puts can be derived by writing output in terms of productivity and 
labor inputs, using the accounting identity discussed in the previous 
section, and subtracting the number of workers and hours per worker 
from both sides of the production function:
P= a × A – (1– a) × (N+H).
A higher level of technology tends to increase firms’ output and 
productivity directly, which can lead to the positive correlation between 
output and productivity observed before 1984. However, the increase 
in technology also affects output and productivity indirectly via its ef-
fect on the level of labor inputs. Thus, the sign of the correlation will 
also depend on the response of labor inputs to the technology shock.9 
Labor inputs are positively related to output, but negatively related to ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  13
productivity, as the output and productivity equations show. Thus, if 
labor inputs rise due to a technology shock, output would expand fur-
ther, but the rise in productivity would be dampened.10 Likewise, if 
a technology shock leads to a short-run decline in labor inputs, the 
output expansion would be dampened and the rise in productivity am-
plified. Hence, technology shocks can generate the procyclical produc-
tivity shown in Table 1 for the period before 1984, provided the direct 
effect of the technology shock on output and productivity dominates 
the indirect influence from the labor inputs. 
In contrast, if technology shocks are not important—consider, for 
example, the extreme case where A is always zero—then output can 
fluctuate only due to nontechnology shocks. These are demand shocks, 
such as shocks to monetary or fiscal policy or to consumer tastes. Sup-
pose that a higher demand for goods and services leads to an expansion 
of output. To meet that output demand, firms must increase employ-
ment and hours per worker, pushing productivity in the opposite di-
rection of output. The resulting business cycle pattern is in line with 
the correlations since 1984 (Table 1). That is, the association between 
productivity and output is weaker or even negative, and the correlation 
between productivity and the labor inputs is negative. 
Empirical evidence
The role of technology shocks in driving fluctuations in productiv-
ity before and after 1984 can be assessed with a statistical model. The 
model is used to estimate the joint dynamics of productivity, employ-
ment, and hours per worker on the two data samples covering the pe-
riods 1948:Q1-1983:Q4 and 1984:Q1-2010:Q2.11 The model relates 
the current value of each of these variables to the values of all variables 
over the past four quarters and to three error terms that capture unex-
plained variation. Each of the error terms of the estimated model is a 
combination of underlying, unobserved technology and nontechnol-
ogy shocks.12
To recover these structural shocks from the error terms, it is as-
sumed that only technology shocks can have a lasting effect on the level 
of productivity.13 This is in line with the theoretical discussion in the 
previous section. The estimated model allows computing these technol-
ogy shocks and evaluating whether their contribution to the cyclical 14  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
fluctuations in productivity, employment, and hours per worker has 
changed since 1984.
Chart 3 shows the model’s estimate of the percentage of fluctua-
tions in productivity growth at different horizons in the future that 
result from technology shocks. Such an exercise is usually referred to as 
a forecast-error variance decomposition. Both before and after 1984, a 
technology shock caused slightly more than 50 percent of the variance 
of productivity growth in the subsequent six years, with the remainder 
attributable to nontechnology shocks. At a one-year horizon, the rela-
tive importance of technology shocks in recent decades has fallen about 
3 percent from the earlier period. Essentially, technology’s contribution 
to the variance of productivity growth has remained at about one half 
in both periods. Hence, a diminished role of such shocks as a driving 
force in the business cycle cannot explain the change in the cyclical 
behavior of productivity.14
III.  THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE  
LABOR MARKET
This section considers the second plausible explanation for the de-
cline in the correlations of productivity with output and labor inputs: 
structural changes in the labor market. Such structural changes could 
alter the response of labor inputs, output, and thus productivity to sup-
ply or demand shocks. While the analysis of this article is concerned 
with the business cycle as a whole, recent jobless recoveries have created 
considerable interest in just the recovery phase of the business cycle. An 
accompanying box examines the relationship between the change in the 
cyclical behavior of productivity and jobless recoveries.
Theoretical channel between structural change in the labor market and 
productivity fluctuations
To assess how structural change may have altered the cyclical be-
havior of productivity, it is useful to first consider why productivity 
growth was procyclical until the mid-1980s. The most common ex-
planation that does not involve supply shocks is the practice of labor 
hoarding by firms (Abel, Bernanke and Croushore). 
Labor hoarding refers to the tendency to use workers less intensive-
ly in recessions than in booms. It reflects the desire by firms to smooth 
employment and paid hours per worker, despite fluctuations in output, 
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commitments that limit labor adjustment, the transactions costs of hir-
ing and firing, the cost of holding an inventory of job-specific skills 
that may be needed quickly during an upturn, and the adverse effects 
of labor adjustment on morale (Fay and Medoff; Okun).15
Labor hoarding behavior is often described in terms of variations 
in unobserved worker effort.16  If employee effort is less intense during 
downturns and more intense during booms, measured hours worked 
fluctuate less than their effective counterpart, which consists of mea-
sured hours adjusted for labor effort. As a result, output may expand 
and contract more than measured labor inputs, giving rise to procyclical 
movements in productivity. Thus, analogous to the theoretical discus-
sion in the previous section, consider a production function that relates 
output to the effective labor input in the following way:
Y= a × (E+N+H).
As represented in this production function, output increases with 
worker effort (E), employment, and hours per worker. As before, the 
parameter a takes a value between zero and one.17 For simplicity, the 
equation abstracts from the level of technology. A model of productiv-
ity is obtained by subtracting from output the number of workers and 
hours per worker:
P= a × E – (1- a) × (N+H ).
These output and productivity equations are identical to the ones 
introduced in the previous section, once the level of technology is sub-
Chart 3
FLUCTUATIONS IN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  
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Box
JOBLESS RECOVERIES AND THE SHIFT IN THE  
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF PRODUCTIVITY
The first two recessions after the 1981-82 recession were fol-
lowed by jobless recoveries, consisting of falling employment in 
the first four to six quarters following the end of the recession. 
In the current recovery, employment declined only two quarters 
subsequent to the trough in real GDP.18 Productivity tends to in-
crease in a jobless recovery, as output rises and employment falls. 
Thus, the jobless recoveries worked to counteract the decline in 
the correlation of productivity and output since the mid-1980s, 
while they exacerbated the decline in the correlation of productiv-
ity and employment. 
Still, the weakened procyclical behavior of productivity since 
the mid-1980s can be reconciled with the jobless recoveries, be-
cause the period of jobless output growth pertained only to a frac-
tion of the duration of the business cycle. Overall, the business 
cycles with jobless recoveries were cycles in which firms adjusted 
employment aggressively rather than smoothly. The size of em-
ployment fluctuations in the last three business cycles has actually 
increased relative to output fluctuations (Table 2).19 
The possible factors that underlie the decline in labor hoard-
ing since the mid-1980s—reduced labor adjustment costs and 
increased industry reallocation—are closely related to some pro-
posed explanations of jobless recoveries.20 First, a decline in labor 
adjustment costs allows firms not only to cut their labor inputs 
sharply during a recession, but also to wait and see the strength of 
the recovery before resuming hiring, rapidly if necessary (Schreft 
and Singh).21 Second, recoveries with large reallocations among in-
dustries are characterized by new job creation rather than by recall-
ing workers. But this new job creation is likely to take longer, as it 
involves a time-consuming process of matching workers to jobs in 
different industries, in different locations, and with different skill 
requirements (Groshen and Potter). Thus, the structural changes 
in the labor market that can explain the weakened relationship 
between productivity and output since the mid-1980s also provide ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  17
Box (continued)
possible explanations for the phenomenon of jobless recover-
ies. However, that phenomenon does not contribute to the de-
cline in the procyclical behavior of productivity. 
stituted for the effort level. However, there are two important concep-
tual differences. 
First, an increase in the level of effort exerted by workers makes the 
economy’s workforce more productive. But such an increase can hardly 
last indefinitely; worker effort eventually reverts to its average level. 
Second, analogous to the determination of hours per worker, the 
effort level may be determined jointly by workers and firms. Firms that 
wish to hoard labor must elicit workers to vary their labor effort. This 
view implies that worker effort can be expected to respond to both sup-
ply and demand shocks.
As a consequence, productivity can move in the same direction or 
in the opposite direction of output, depending on the responsiveness 
of worker effort. For instance, a slowdown in demand would prompt 
a firm to adjust output, partly by reducing employment and hours per 
worker and partly by letting the remaining workers exert less effort. 
While the former tends to raise productivity, the latter tends to reduce 
it, as shown in the productivity expression above. Thus, if effort is re-
duced sufficiently relative to the measured labor inputs, the correlation 
of productivity with output and labor inputs is positive (as in Table 1, 
before 1984). In contrast, if worker effort is not very responsive to a de-
mand shock, firms adjust output mainly by lowering employment and 
hours per worker—and thus raise productivity. Hence, in the absence 
of labor hoarding the correlation of productivity with output and labor 
inputs is negative (as in Table 1, after 1984).22 
Labor hoarding may have declined since the mid-1980s due to two 
structural changes. The first change is a decline in labor adjustment 
costs. The second change is intensified reallocation across industries 
and a—possibly related—increase in firm-level uncertainty.
Labor adjustment costs can fall because of a decline in hiring and 
firing costs. Hiring cost reductions may be related to improved match-18  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ing of workers with jobs, reducing the time and expense of finding em-
ployees that fit the specific needs of a job. The rise of Internet-based job 
matching may have reduced this cost by making it easier for workers to 
find jobs and firms to find and compare job candidates.23 Firing cost 
reductions may be related to declining trade union membership, which 
has likely diminished strong contractual job protections and high sever-
ance pay from employers. 
Labor adjustment costs may have also decreased due to the increasing 
substitutability of labor and computers. In particular, this substitutabil-
ity reduces the value of job-specific skills. While information technology 
complements highly educated workers engaged in abstract tasks and has 
less impact on low-skilled workers performing manual tasks, it substi-
tutes for moderately educated workers performing routine tasks (Autor, 
Katz and Kearney). This “skill-biased technical change” has made the 
middle tier of white-collar workers particularly vulnerable to replacement 
by computers or outsourcing. By diminishing the value of certain job-
specific skills, it may enable firms to readily adjust hours. Specifically, it 
may allow firms to engage in more dramatic cost-cutting during reces-
sions and adjust hours more than proportionally to output (Gordon). 
Indeed, evidence suggests that firms have increasingly turned to 
flexible types of labor inputs. For instance, temporary hiring, part-time 
hiring, and overtime—collectively known as just-in-time hiring—has 
gained in importance since the 1990-91 recession (Schreft and Singh). 
This evidence is consistent with the idea that employment adjustment 
has become less costly for firms.
The second structural change pertains to firms’ outlook for their 
product demand. Even if labor adjustment costs have remained un-
changed, firms may have become more willing to absorb those costs. 
They may perceive the decline in demand for their goods as more long-
lasting in recent recessions, or the recovery of that demand as more 
uncertain.24 In the 1960s and 1970s, business fluctuations were exac-
erbated by the Federal Reserve’s go-stop policy. The Federal Reserve 
would stimulate employment in the “go” phase, until the public became 
concerned about inflation. Then interest rate hikes would initiate the 
“stop” phase to bring inflation down (Goodfriend). This policy cycle 
shaped the economy’s response to shocks in a predictable way, arguably 
providing some degree of predictability for firms about the impact of a ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  19
recession on their industry.25 In that case, firms could be more likely to 
let their workers sweep the factory floor until demand returned.
Since the early 1980s, firms’ product demand may have become 
less predictable. Monetary policy has been widely seen as much more 
effective in stabilizing, rather than exacerbating, shocks to the econo-
my. Partly as a result, intensified employment reallocation may have 
gained importance relative to temporary declines in employment in 
the recessions since the early 1980s. In the recessions up to that time, 
employment in most industries followed a cyclical pattern: job losses 
during the recession followed by gains in the recovery. In contrast, em-
ployment in many industries in the 2001 recession followed a differ-
ent pattern: industries that lost jobs in the recession continued to lose 
jobs in the recovery, and industries that gained jobs in the recession 
continued to gain jobs in the recovery (Groshen and Potter).26 The 
diminished contribution of temporary layoffs to the rise in the unem-
ployment rate in the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions serves as further 
evidence. The 2007-09 recession also displayed a reduced reliance on 
temporary layoffs (Knotek and Terry).
In line with this evidence, some studies indicate that volatility has 
followed diverging trends at the aggregate and firm levels. While the 
growth rate of aggregate sales has become more stable, sales at the firm 
level have become more volatile (Comin and Mulani).27 Hence, if a 
firm perceives the recession as heralding a permanent decline in its in-
dustry or as generating strong uncertainty as to whether its demand will 
recover, the firm has a strong incentive to cut hours and eliminate jobs 
despite the associated costs of adjustment.28
Empirical evidence
These structural changes can affect productivity fluctuations 
through a decline in labor hoarding. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
find direct evidence of the role of structural change. There are no mea-
sures of the aggregate worker effort level to examine the role of labor 
hoarding. Moreover, the effort level is chosen jointly by employers and 
workers, in contrast to a shock. As a result, it cannot be identified in 
a model with as few assumptions as the supply shock discussed in the 
previous section.29 However, this “endogeneity” of work effort suggests 
that if a decline of labor hoarding underlies the shift in the cyclical 20  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
properties of productivity, then these properties would change regard-
less of the type of shock that buffets the economy. That is, structural 
change in the labor market would likely lead to a shift in the correla-
tions of productivity with output or labor inputs stemming from either 
supply or demand shocks. 
The estimated model from the previous section allows computing 
the correlations conditional on supply shocks or demand shocks only. 
Feeding only the supply shocks or the demand shocks into the estimat-
ed model generates a time series of productivity growth, employment 
growth, and hours per worker growth conditional on only one type 
of shock.30 The corresponding conditional output growth series can 
be computed by adding up growth in productivity, employment, and 
hours per worker, according to the definition of output in Section I. 
Table 3
CORRELATIONS CONDITIONAL ON SUPPLY AND  
DEMAND SHOCKS











Productivity-Output 0.89 0.87 -0.02 0.79 0.90 0.11***
Productivity-Employment -0.60 -0.92 -0.32*** -0.66 -0.95 -0.29***
Productivity-Hours -0.23 -0.84 -0.61*** 0.06 -0.77 -0.83***
Output-Employment -0.17 -0.61 -0.44*** -0.07 -0.75 -0.68***
Output-Hours 0.18 -0.50 -0.68*** 0.57 -0.45 -1.02***
Employment-Hours 0.71 0.90 0.19*** 0.52 0.85 0.33***
Demand shocks
Productivity-Output 0.82 0.52 -0.30*** 0.74 0.23 -0.51***
Productivity- Employment 0.45 -0.08 -0.53*** 0.33 -0.17 -0.50***
Productivity-Hours 0.36 -0.04 -0.40*** 0.65 0.14 -0.51***
Output-Employment 0.85 0.73 -0.12** 0.87 0.90 0.03
Output-Hours 0.63 0.55 -0.08 0.74 0.76 0.02
Employment-Hours 0.40 0.31 -0.09 0.43 0.56 0.13*
Note: Variables are expressed in logarithms and growth rates are approximated by first differences. Test 
of equality of correlations across the two subsamples is based on Fisher’s z-transformation. Significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by *,**, and ***, respectively.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  21
These conditional time series can then be used to compute correlations 
conditional on supply shocks or demand shocks.31
The correlations of productivity and output and those of produc-
tivity and the labor inputs conditional on supply shocks (Table 3, Panel 
A) and demand shocks (Panel B) are computed before and after 1984. 
The results show a decline in the correlations of productivity and labor 
inputs, regardless of the type of shock. The correlation of productivity 
and output declines only when conditional on demand shocks.
As shown in Panel A, the relationship between productivity and out-
put generated by supply shocks has strengthened since the mid-1980s. 
However, these shocks induce a much more negative relationship be-
tween productivity and labor inputs, especially hours per worker. The 
relationship between productivity and employment induced by supply 
shocks weakened less, as it was already quite negative before the mid-
1980s. A negative correlation of productivity and aggregate hours or 
employment conditional on supply shocks is well-documented (Gali). 
However, since 1984 the relationship between productivity and hours 
per worker conditional on supply shocks has become almost as negative 
as that of productivity and employment. 
The conditional correlations of output with the labor inputs also 
indicate that the response of hours per worker to a supply shock has 
become more similar to that of employment since the mid-1980s. The 
conditional correlation of output and employment is negative in both 
periods. In recent decades, supply shocks have also driven output and 
hours per worker in opposite directions. In particular, for business cycle 
components measured by the HP filter, the correlation between output 
and hours per worker was 0.57 before 1984 and -0.45 since then.
Panel B shows how the correlations have changed since 1984 con-
ditional on demand shocks. The relationship between productivity and 
output generated by demand shocks has weakened significantly, which 
confirms that demand shocks are responsible for the decline in the un-
conditional productivity-output correlation.32 In addition, the correla-
tions between productivity and labor inputs have declined significantly 
conditional on demand shocks. These shocks generate a negative re-
lationship between productivity and employment, in contrast to the 
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These results suggest that the shifts in correlations are due to struc-
tural change that altered the transmission of a shock to the labor market 
and thereby changed the response of productivity to different types of 
shocks. As argued above, structural changes in the economy that have 
resulted in less labor hoarding may explain the evidence in the table.
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NASCENT RECOVERY
The analysis in the previous sections has shown that the cyclicality 
of productivity has declined significantly since the mid-1980s. What, 
then, are the implications for the current recovery? 
Early in the current expansion, which likely began in the second half 
of 2009, employment continued to decline and productivity surged. 
Productivity expanded in the last three quarters of 2009 at an annual 
average rate of 7.1 percent, more than twice as fast as the average annual 
growth rate since 1995 of 2.6 percent. However, productivity growth 
proceeded at a more sluggish pace in the first half of 2010 (1.5 percent).
Although productivity was clearly boosted by falling hours worked 
in 2009, it also may have benefited from changes in technology, such as 
cost-saving reorganizations other than layoffs and cutbacks in hours. As 
the expansion continues to take hold, further improvements in technol-
ogy will likely become increasingly difficult. Of course, such changes 
in technology are hard to predict.33 Nonetheless, the last two expan-
sions in the 1990s and 2000s likely benefited significantly from new 
information and communication technologies. As the productivity-
enhancing benefits of the investments in information and communica-
tion technologies during the 1990s have probably played out, efficiency 
gains are not likely to maintain the rapid pace of the late 1990s and the 
first half of the 2000s (Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh). The analysis suggests 
that productivity will benefit from better technology—relative to de-
mand shocks—as it has in typical postwar business cycles. But changes 
in technology are unlikely to boost productivity enough to generate 
the strongly procyclical pattern seen before the mid-1980s. After all, 
productivity has lost its strongly procyclical character in recent decades, 
while the relative contribution of supply shocks to the business cycle 
has remained steady.
As argued above, structural changes in the labor market are a plau-
sible explanation for the shift in the cyclical behavior of productivity. 
Such changes may have made worker effort less responsive to economic ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  23
conditions in recent decades. If that remains the case in the current 
expansion, the dynamics of productivity will be determined mainly by 
the growth in labor inputs. Specifically, a continuing rebound in hiring 
and hours per worker will dampen productivity growth. In turn, the 
diminished responsiveness of worker effort to economic activity implies 
that the dynamics of output will be determined mainly by the growth 
in labor inputs.
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article finds that the cyclicality of labor productivity has de-
clined significantly since the mid-1980s. The decline in the correla-
tion of productivity and output has taken place conditional on demand 
shocks. Associated with this decline are sharp drops in the correlation 
of productivity and labor inputs. In particular, the correlation of pro-
ductivity and hours per worker displayed sharp declines conditional 
on all types of shocks. The shift in the business cycle behavior of pro-
ductivity is most likely due to structural changes in the labor market. 
These changes may have induced firms to diminish the practice of labor 
hoarding.
Looking ahead, productivity growth should slow as the economic 
expansion proceeds. The expansion of output will then be driven main-
ly by gains in employment and hours per worker. 24  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1The present article is related to recent papers by Gali and Gambetti and by 
Gordon, who also emphasize the shift in the cyclical behavior of productivity. 
Unlike Gordon’s analysis, this article examines the role of supply shocks in gen-
erating that shift. The article extends the analysis of Gali and Gambetti in three 
respects. First, it allows the labor inputs to vary along the employment and hours 
per worker margins. Second, it includes data of the severe recession of 2007-09. 
Third, it analyzes structural changes in the labor market that may explain the shift 
in the cyclical behavior of productivity.
2The official arbiter of recessions in the United States, the National Bureau 
of Economic Research, has not yet declared the trough date of the recession at the 
time of writing. In Chart 1, the recession is assumed to end after the trough of 
output, which is in the second quarter of 2009.
3Employment and hours per worker are sometimes referred to as the exten-
sive and intensive margin of labor, respectively.
4Convention is followed by setting the smoothing parameter of the Hodrick 
and Prescott filter to 1,600 for quarterly data.
5The break date of 1984 has been chosen to coincide with the year that is 
often identified as the beginning of the Great Moderation. This is in line with the 
date emphasized by Gali and Gambetti, and close to the break date of Gordon, 
which is 1986.
6Stiroh provides a similar variance decomposition, but he does not distin-
guish between the extensive and intensive margin of labor. His results are consis-
tent with those reported in Table 2.
7The change in the size of employment fluctuations relative to output fluc-
tuations is also reflected in Okun’s law. Using a version of Okun’s law that re-
lates changes in the (un)employment rate to percent changes in output growth, 
Knotek finds that until the mid-1980s, an increase in the employment rate was 
associated with a rapid rate of real GDP growth (at least four percent). But since 
the mid-1980s, even moderate real GDP growth (two percent or higher) is as-
sociated with a rising employment rate. Gordon uses a version of Okun’s law that 
relates the employment rate to a measure of the output gap. He likewise reports 
that the long-run response of the employment rate to changes in the output gap 
increased in the period since 1986.
8For simplicity, the production function omits the production factor capital. 
There are two ways to think about the role of capital in this analysis. First, the 
capital stock tends to be fairly constant over the business cycle, in which case it is 
not important for the purpose of business cycle analysis. This is arguably a good 
assumption for certain types of capital with a long life, such as structures. Second, 
capital may be viewed as embodying new technologies, in which case they may be ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  25
viewed as part of the technology level. This is arguably a reasonable assumption 
for equipment and software.
9The sign of the short-run response of labor to a technology shock is the 
subject of controversy in the empirical literature. Nonetheless, if one accounts 
for the trend changes in productivity, the data indicate that labor declines after a 
technology improvement (Fernald). The empirical results in Table 3 in the next 
section are in line with this finding. 
10In principle, the indirect effect of a rise in labor inputs could dominate the 
direct effect of an increase in technology, thus generating a decline in productivity. 
This would render the technology shock explanation of procyclical productivity 
obsolete. However, this is not observed in the empirical results below. One reason 
for this is that the value of a is typically thought to be at least 2/3, so the produc-
tivity equation places more weight on the direct effect of the technology improve-
ment than on the indirect effect of the labor inputs.
11The time series used cover the nonfarm business sector. The hypothesis of 
a unit root in the level of these variables cannot be rejected, so all variables enter 
the model in growth rates. Productivity growth exhibits some low-frequency co-
movement with labor inputs, which is presumably not associated with the phe-
nomenon of business cycles. This co-movement is controlled for by adjusting the 
growth rate of productivity for its average in the three sub-periods marked by 
1973Q2 and 1997Q2 (Fernald).
12 The model is a fourth-order vector autoregression model. The order is set 
equal to four following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson; Fernald; Francis 
and Ramey; and Gali and Rabanal.
13The long-run identifying restriction follows Blanchard and Quah. Two ad-
ditional assumptions are imposed. First, the variance of the technology and non-
technology shocks is equal to one—a normalization—and second, the shocks are 
mutually uncorrelated. The technology shock is the only shock that is identified 
by these three assumptions. Since the two non-technology shocks are not sepa-
rately identified they can only be referred to jointly.
14Gali and Gambetti also find that the role of technology shocks for produc-
tivity fluctuations did not diminish in relative importance since the mid-1980s. 
On the contrary, they find that technology shocks account for an increased share 
of productivity fluctuations in recent decades. This different finding could be due 
to differences in their methodology from the one described above. However, their 
result strengthens the finding that a decline in the relative importance of tech-
nology shocks is not a plausible explanation of the changed cyclical behavior of 
productivity.
15An alternative, less popular explanation of the procyclical behavior of pro-
ductivity is based on the observation that certain tasks in the production process 
support production but do not contribute directly to output when they are per-
formed. Examples are training or the maintenance of equipment. If firms assign 26  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
more workers to such tasks during a downturn, then fewer such tasks will remain 
during the upturn. As a result, labor inputs fluctuate less than output, and pro-
ductivity moves in the same direction as output. In this view, firms choose to 
smooth labor even though they can freely adjust it. 
16More generally, labor hoarding describes the idea of variable factor utiliza-
tion. This need not be limited to the production factor labor; the flow of capital 
services also depends on the utilization rate of the capital stock. Moreover, unlike 
for worker effort, aggregate measures of the capital utilization rate are available. 
However, a commonly used measure, the Federal Reserve Board’s measure of total 
capacity utilization, suggests that changes in the cyclical properties of capacity 
utilization are not a good explanation of the shift in the cyclical behavior of pro-
ductivity. Capacity utilization, available from 1967 onward, is highly procyclical 
before and since 1984 (using the HP filter), and the volatility of capacity utiliza-
tion relative to that of output did not decline.
17Yet another possible explanation of procyclical productivity is the presence 
of increasing returns to scale in production, which corresponds to a parameter   
greater than one. This explanation is not pursued further as a source of structural 
change, because it is difficult to justify a large shift in this parameter.
18The current recovery does not seem to be jobless, yet at the time of writ-
ing (the third quarter of 2010) it is too early to assess how rapid the pace of job 
growth will be.
19The variance of employment fell by less than half since 1984, whereas the 
variance of output fell by substantially more than half. Consequently, the variance 
of employment relative to the variance of output has increased.
20The reasons for the decline in labor hoarding suggested above are related 
to structural explanations of jobless recoveries. However, cyclical explanations of 
jobless recoveries have also been proposed. Bachmann argues that the jobless re-
coveries of the 1990s and 2000s were related to the shallowness of the preceding 
recessions. In particular, he shows that following a mild downturn, firms may first 
wish to increase hours per worker rather than employment because hiring is costly. 
Kahn argues that the first jobless recovery was due in part to an anemic recovery of 
output. Although some of these studies consider the behavior of productivity dur-
ing the jobless stage of the recovery, they do not study the behavior of productivity 
over the business cycle.
21Firms may also have waited longer before shedding workers at the onset of 
the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions than in previous postwar recessions.
22A large enough decline in labor hoarding behavior suffices to explain the 
shift in correlations in Table 1. However, structural changes in the labor market 
may even have tended to raise worker effort during recent recessions. For instance, 
firms’ ability to retain the most productive workers during a recession may have 
improved as a result of reduced worker protections since the 1980s.
23Evidence that Internet-based search has increased the efficiency of job 
matching remains scarce. Stevenson presents evidence that Internet-based search 
increases the likelihood to switch jobs for employed workers.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  27
24Increased firm-level uncertainty about demand may also have diminished 
the role of non-production or support work, which is the explanation of pro-
cyclical productivity that does not rely on labor adjustment costs. That is, if a 
firm views the recovery of its demand as highly uncertain, it is less likely to as-
sign workers to temporary non-production activities such as maintenance. That 
would lead to a decline in the correlation of productivity and output.
25Despite this policy cycle, recessions were times of intensified industry real-
location even before the 1980s. For instance, the oil price shocks of 1973 and 
1979-80 may have had long-lasting effects on particular industries. Davis and 
Haltiwanger find that oil price shocks in the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to sub-
stantial reallocation in manufacturing. 
26The account of increased reallocation across industries has been criticized 
by Aaronson, Rissman and Sullivan. They disagree with Groshen and Potter’s 
measure of industry reallocation, and argue that better measures do not point to 
an increase in reallocation in the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions compared with 
preceding ones. 
27Akin to the criticism on the industry reallocation story, the account of in-
creased firm-level volatility has been criticized by Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and 
Miranda for relying on a sample of only publicly traded firms. Using an employ-
ment-based measure of firm-level volatility, they argue that the rise in the volatility of 
publicly-held firms is dominated by a decline in the volatility of privately-held firms.
28Increased firm-level volatility since the mid-1980s may also accelerate the 
reallocation of capital across firms, from plants that shut down to more produc-
tive ones. This would raise productivity in a downturn, thus contributing to the 
decline in the correlation of productivity and output.
29Gali and van Rens analyze an economic model with worker effort to ex-
plain the vanishing procyclicality of productivity. 
30The demand shocks that are uncovered by the estimated model consist of 
the two nontechnology shocks, which in turn consist of a combination of struc-
tural disturbances such as shocks to monetary and fiscal policy and consumer 
tastes, as mentioned above. The demand shocks can be interpreted as such be-
cause they do not affect productivity in the long run.
31To compute the correlations of HP-filtered conditional time series, the 
growth rates are converted back to logarithms of the levels and then their HP 
trend is removed.
32Gali and Gambetti also confirm that nontechnology (demand) shocks are 
largely responsible for the decline in the correlation between productivity and 
aggregate hours and between productivity and output. However, they do not dif-
ferentiate between the intensive and extensive margin of labor.
33Even average productivity growth is difficult to forecast. For instance, Jor-
genson, Ho and Stiroh foresee possible scenarios of average productivity growth 
ranging between 1.4 percent and 2.8 percent in the decade 2006-2016. Congres-28  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
sional Budget Office (CBO) (Table 2-2) projects potential productivity growth of 
1.7 percent in the period 2010-2014. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  29
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